The Influence of the Legal Environment On the Development of the Nonprofit Sector by Stephan Toepler
  
 
Center for Civil Society Studies 
 












THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT ON 















About the working paper series: 
The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies distributes working papers in this 
series by authors affiliated with the Center in the interest of timely dissemination of 
information and ideas. The papers are not reviewed and the views represented in them 




Center for Civil Society Studies 
The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies 
3400 N. Charles Street, Wyman Building / Baltimore MD 21218-2688 
(410) 516-5463 / Fax (410) 516-7818 / ccss@jhu.edu / www.jhu.edu/~ccss 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT ON THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR1 
 
 








The recent growth of interest in the nonprofit sector throughout the world has 
prompted increased attention to the creation of an enabling legal environment for such 
organizations. Evidence of this attention is apparent in the efforts to formulate new laws 
on foundations and associations in Central and Eastern Europe, South Africa, Japan, other 
parts of Asia, and even Western Europe; and in the work of such organizations as the 
World Bank, Civicus, the Open Society Institute, and the Commonwealth Foundation to 
outline the rudiments of what a favorable legal framework for nonprofit action might look 
like. 
 
Underlying these efforts is the belief that the evolution of the nonprofit sector in 
different countries can be significantly affected by the “favorability” or “unfavorability” 
of the legal framework within which nonprofit organizations operate. While nonprofit 
organizations are, to a significant extent, informal organizations, they nevertheless 
interact with the formal mechanisms of the law in a variety of ways, from the 
establishment of legal personality and its resultant protection of members and officers 
from personal legal liability for the organization’s actions, to provisions in the tax law 
which encourage or discourage philanthropic contributions to such organizations.   
Indeed, denial of the right to organize associations has been a favored mechanism used by 
repressive regimes to avoid protest and maintain control (Fisher 1998, p.40).  By no 
means, however, are unfavorable legal frameworks for nonprofit action restricted to 
authoritarian regimes. In France, for example, intermediary organizations were abolished 
after the French revolution and a law authorizing private associations was not put into 
place until the beginning of the 20th century. Foundations, moreover, remained without 
explicit legal status until the late 1980s (Archambault, 1997; Archambault, Boumendil 
and Tsyboula, 1999). Similarly, in Germany, as one scholar had noted, “the tax law 
constitutes the central barrier that prohibits the evolution of a prosperous foundation 
community” (Flämig, quoted in Toepler, 1998, p.154). 
 
For all the conviction with which it is held, however, the presumed link between 
the legal environment for nonprofit action and the development of a viable nonprofit 
                                                 
1
  Versions of this paper were presented at the 4th International Conference of ISTR, Dublin, July 5-8, 
2000, and the 28th Annual Conference of ARNOVA, Washington, DC, November  4-6, 1999.  
Salamon and Toepler  The Influence of the Legal Environment on…the Nonprofit Sector 
 2 
sector may not be as clear cut as many believe. For one thing, despite considerable 
discussion, there is still a great deal of disagreement over what a “favorable” legal regime 
for nonprofit action really is. In some places, for example, favorable laws on tax 
exemptions for charitable contributions are considered absolutely essential for the 
development of the nonprofit sector, whereas elsewhere they are considered at best 
irrelevant and at worst actually harmful to the promotion of the altruistic spirit for which 
this sector is supposed to stand. Indeed, an effort by the World Bank to outline a set of 
principles to guide the framing of such laws encountered considerable resistance, even 
among many in support of its general goals. One reason for this may be that an effective 
conceptual framework has yet to be developed for linking provisions of law to the 
development of the nonprofit sector and for deciding which provisions are likely to be 
most important and which least. 
 
Beyond this, the analysis of legal provisions is especially fraught with difficulties.  
Law, by its nature, is exceedingly complex, and seemingly innocuous phrases can have 
immense special meaning.  What is more, legal provisions affecting nonprofit 
organizations can be scattered widely throughout national legal systems, and it is quite 
possible that seemingly encouraging provisions in one body of law can be countermanded 
by restrictive provisions in another.  Anybody seeking to analyze the impact of law on the 
development of particular social and economic structures must therefore proceed with 
great care.  
 
In addition to this, the legal framework is only one part of the larger social and 
institutional context that determines the proliferation, or non-proliferation, of nonprofit 
organizations, and other political, economic or cultural factors may mitigate or even 
counter any direct effects of the law. Brazil, for example, adopted an essentially British 
model of nonprofit law in the early nineteenth century, but it was not until the latter 
twentieth century that other conditions became ripe for the blossoming of nonprofit 
activity in this country (Landim, 1997). Not only can enabling laws fail to produce 
nonprofit action, moreover, but restrictive laws can also fail to discourage it. Regulatory 
action that seeks to suppress or prevent the emergence of nonprofits can simply push 
nonprofit actors towards informal, legally unrecognized forms of organizing. In the case 
of Egypt, for example, Kandil (1997, p.361) notes: “Severe legal constraints faced by 
Egyptian associations and foundations reflect the efforts of the State to dominate not only 
the voluntary or nonprofit sector, but civil society in general. But as with many such 
efforts, they have proven only partially successful. Indirectly, and perhaps ironically, the 
distrustful State has served to strengthen at least one broad-based form of opposition: the 
Islamic movement.” 
 
Finally, the presence or absence of laws that are favorable to nonprofit action is 
only one part of the equation that determines the legal impact on the development of this 
sector.  Laws must also be enforced to be effective. Conceivably, repressive laws may not 
have negative effects because in practice they are not fully enforced (Fisher, 1998, pp.40-
1) and the same can be true in reverse.  Beyond the formal provisions of law, therefore, 
attention must be paid as well to the way in which laws are enforced. 
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Despite these difficulties, we believe it is important to investigate more 
systematically than has been done to date the actual relationship that exists between the 
legal environment for nonprofit action and the development of nonprofit organizations. 
To do so, we tap a unique body of data on both the scope and structure of the nonprofit 
sector and the key provisions of law pertaining to this sector developed as part of The 
Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (Salamon and Anheier 1996; 
Salamon et. al. 1999).  More specifically, the paper first sets forth a conceptual 
framework for thinking about the relationship between law and the nonprofit sector.  
Against this backdrop, it then shows how this framework can be applied to develop a set 
of “scores” measuring the extent to which a country’s laws are favorable or unfavorable 
toward the development of the nonprofit sector. Finally, the paper provides a preliminary 
test of the extent to which the favorability of a country’s legal framework actually affects 
the size of its nonprofit sector.  
 
In undertaking this analysis, we are well aware of its preliminary nature. For one 
thing, our focus at this stage is on the formal provisions of law only and no attempt has 
been made to gauge the actual implementation or administration of these laws. In the 
second place, we treat the various legal provisions as essentially equally important even 
though we know that some are likely to be more influential than others.  Although an 
attempt has been made to assess the relative importance of different legal provisions 
through a survey of legal experts, we do not utilize that data here. Thirdly, to facilitate 
any meaningful comparative analysis, we have had to concentrate on only the broad 
outlines of some of the key legal provisions. While we realize that legal scholars will find 
this reduction of complexity problematic, it nevertheless represents a necessary 
compromise in order to permit even the kind of exploratory cross-national testing we are 
undertaking of prevailing beliefs about the consequences of the legal environment on 
nonprofit development. Finally, the legal information available—to the extent that we 
could ascertain—reflects the legal and fiscal frameworks in place for the base year 1995.  
Although it is reasonable to assume that such provisions have been in place for a 
considerable period of time in most countries given the relative slowness of legal change, 
this assumption is doubtless inappropriate in some cases, particularly those in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and this will have to be taken into account in drawing conclusions. 
 
Despite these acknowledged limitations, however, we believe the kind of 
systematic analysis of legal provisions and their apparent consequences that we have 
undertaken here can shed useful theoretical and empirical light on the development of the 
nonprofit sector from place to place, and may be of assistance as well in guiding policy in 
this field. Let us turn, therefore, to the framework we have developed and then to the 
results that it yields. 
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TRANSACTION COSTS AND NONPROFIT LAW: 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
With few exceptions, such as economic analyses of the effects of tax law changes 
on private donations (see Steinberg, 1990, for an overview), systematic empirical study of 
nonprofit law is still in its infancy. This is even more true in comparative perspective.  
Discussions of nonprofit law internationally have so far been largely descriptive, 
identifying salient issues and, at best, grouping them under common headings (Salamon, 
1997; World Bank, 1997). While some useful work has been done in analyzing legal 
provisions (e.g. Silk et. al. 1999), the analysis is rarely based on systematic evidence 
about what the impact of various legal provisions actually is. Legal scholars and 
policymakers are thus left with nothing but conjecture to assess the likely consequences 
that particular legal provisions might have.  
 
To make progress in this field, therefore, a more systematic analytical framework 
is needed, one that can provide a more conceptually coherent basis for measuring the 
effects of legal provisions on nonprofit development. One promising source for such a 
framework is the set of concepts embodied in what has come to be called the “New 
Institutionalism” that has emerged in various disciplines, such as economics, sociology 
and organization theory.  Central to neo-institutional thinking is the concept of 
“transaction costs.” Transaction costs are the costs associated with the costs of the 
interactions necessary to accomplish various tasks in a complex society.  As articulated 
by economist Douglas North, one of the important functions of institutions is that they 
reduce transaction costs by creating permanent structures through which interactions can 
take place. As North succinctly put it in his Nobel Prize Lecture, “When it is costly to 
transact, then institutions matter" (North, 1998, p. 248).: "[I]nstitutions arise and persist,” 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991, pp.3-4) thus note, when they confer benefits greater than the 
transaction cots [sic] (that is, the costs of negotiation, execution, and enforcement) 
incurred in creating and sustaining them." 
 
This concept of transaction costs has important implications for nonprofit 
organizations, and for the impact that law may have on them.  In a sense, law can affect 
the transaction costs involved in creating and utilizing nonprofit organizations.  It can 
thus importantly affect the extent to which nonprofit institutions come into existence and 
persist.  It can do so, moreover, in two different ways: first, it can affect the demand for 
such institutions by influencing the costs faced by those contemplating relying on such 
organizations (the demand side effect); and second, it can affect the supply of such 
organizations by influencing the costs involved in forming and operating such 
organizations (the supply side). Some legal provisions can affect both sides of the 
equation at once, moreover, and often in divergent ways. This is the case, for example, 
with public reporting requirements, which can give the public more confidence that 
nonprofit organizations are not abusing their trust, but at the expense of discouraging 
potential nonprofit entrepreneurs from forming nonprofit agencies because of the 
reporting burdens involved. 
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Whatever the exact impact of particular provisions, the notion of demand-side and 
supply-side transaction costs suggests a framework for conceptualizing the impact of law 
on nonprofit development.  Essentially, we can argue that law can encourage the 
development of the nonprofit sector to the extent that it reduces both the demand-side and 
supply-side transaction costs associated with nonprofit organizations. But how can this 
occur? 
 
Demand-Side Transaction Costs 
 
To date, most of the discussion of nonprofit law and its impact on the nonprofit 
sector has focused on what we have termed the supply side of the equation—how hard it 
is to start or operate nonprofit organizations. It may be useful to begin our discussion 
here, therefore, by examining the important demand-side factors that are also involved. 
This is particularly so given the centrality of these factors in much of the broader 
theoretical work on this sector.  
 
One of more salient nonprofit theories, for example, argues that the nonprofit 
sector exists largely because of information asymmetries that confront consumers with 
respect to particular classes of goods and services (Hansmann 1980). In particular, these 
asymmetries are most severe where the consumer of a good or service is not the same as 
the purchaser (e.g. day care or nursing home care), breaking a link that is crucial to 
market transactions, or where the nature of the good or service makes it difficult for 
consumers to judge the quality effectively (e.g. health care).  In such situations, 
Hansmann observes, consumers need some assurance other than what the market can 
provide to give them the confidence that they are getting their money’s worth. In 
Hansmann's conceptualization, nonprofit organizations can provide such assurance 
because of the “nondistribution constraint” under which they operate, i.e., the fact that 
they do not distribute profits to their owners or directors. This makes them more 
trustworthy since they have fewer incentives to cut corners in order to increase their 
profits.  Put somewhat differently, to the extent that the nondistribution constraint applies, 
consumers can avoid the transaction costs they would otherwise confront in assessing the 
quality of the goods and services they are purchasing simply by securing these goods or 
services from nonprofit providers. What this means for our purposes is that legal 
provisions that clearly impose a nonprofit distribution constraint on nonprofit 
organizations can have the effect of reassuring potential consumers of nonprofit services, 
further reducing their transaction costs, and thereby increasing their propensity to turn to 
nonprofit organizations.  To the extent this is so, therefore, we would expect a positive 
relationship between the presence of such legal requirements and the scale of the 
nonprofit sector in a country.  
 
The nondistribution constraint and its enforcement in law is only one factor that 
will affect the transaction costs that consumers may face in their dealings with nonprofit 
organizations.  In fact, Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1993, pp.45-8) argue that additional 
safeguards are needed to create the trust on which nonprofit organizations depend. Thus, 
for example, potential purchasers need assurance that there will not be a hidden 
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distribution of profits, for example through unreasonable personal benefits or 
compensation for members or managers. Similarly, explicit transparency requirements 
can provide additional assurance that organizations are operating in a way that is 
consistent with public expectations.  
 
Although perhaps less obvious at first sight, internal governance arrangements can 
also reduce the transaction costs involved in dealing with nonprofits and therefore affect 
the demand for nonprofit services.  This is so for two reasons. Firstly, both consumers 
and suppliers need to know who is authorized to act (and to enter into valid contracts) on 
behalf of the organization.  Otherwise, there is no security in transactions with the 
organization.  Secondly, requirements for democratic governance can give consumers 
additional confidence that the organization is operating in a way that is consistent with 
public trust. 
 
In addition, the regulation of fundraising campaigns and activities also figures 
prominently as a mechanism of protecting public trust.  Donors typically assume that their 
contributions are fully put to use for the intended purposes. Fraudulent fundraising 
practices, inaccurate promises for the use of funds, or high fundraising and administrative 
costs that reduce the share of a donation that is actually used for providing services, when 
exposed, undermine the credibility and legitimacy not only of the offending organization, 
but frequently also of the sector or parts of the sector as a whole.  The existence of legal 
provisions curbing the potential abuse of fundraising can therefore have important 
demand-side effects on nonprofit revenues and development. 
 
In short, as shown in Table 1, four sets of legal provisions can significantly affect 
the transaction costs that users of nonprofit services or activities face and therefore the 
likelihood that they will turn to such organizations and consequently increase their size.  
The first of these relates to the nondistribution constraint under which nonprofits operate; 
the second to the broader transparency requirements to which they are required to adhere; 
the third to the governance structures and degree of democratic control they are required 
to exhibit; and the fourth to the regulation of public campaigns and other fundraising 
activities. In each of these cases, the nonprofit form in and of itself provides some 
reduction in transaction costs that consumers face compared to what they would face if 
they had to contract for such services on the open market.  At the same time, in each case, 
the protections that consumers gain can be enhanced by reinforcing the natural 
protections afforded by nonprofit status with the power of law, strengthening and 
institutionalizing the protections far more than mere voluntary compliance might provide.  
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Table 1: Demand-Side Indicators 
 
Nondistribution Provisions 
• Nondistribution constraint? 
• Personal benefit restrictions? 
Reporting 
• Reporting requirements? 
• Public access to information? 
Governance 
• Responsible agent? 
• Participation requirements?  
Fundraising 
• Registration or permit requirements? 
• Substantive restrictions (e.g., fundraising costs)? 
 
 
To the extent this is true, we would expect that in countries with nondistribution 
constraints on the books, consumers are more likely to patronize nonprofit organizations 
than in countries where the legal system does not stipulate such constraints.  Similarly, 
legally enforced personal benefit restrictions, information disclosure requirements, 
governance provisions, and fundraising regulation can be expected to work in the same 
way. The greater the degree to which such "consumer protections" and information 
requirements are formalized in the legal system, the lesser the transaction costs for 
demand-side stakeholders and the greater the size of the nonprofit sector. 
 
Supply-Side Transaction Costs 
 
Demand-side transaction costs are not the only ones that are likely to affect the 
scope of the nonprofit sector in a country.  Also important are the transaction costs facing 
those who would create and operate such organizations, and hence affecting the supply of 
such organizations available to meet the demand. 
 
A central tenet of neo-institutional economics is that organizations come into 
existence when the costs of operating without them exceeds the cost of creating them 
(Coase, 1937, 1960; Williamson, 1975). The more burdensome the requirements to 
establish and operate such organizations, therefore, the less likely are entrepreneurs to 
come forward to establish them (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1993, pp.40-1).  On the 
other hand, the easier it is to form and operate such organizations, the more likely they are 
to be formed.  
 
Law is only one of the potential barriers to the formation of nonprofit 
organizations, of course. Others include time, the ability to mobilize financial resources 
and the mobilization of additional adherents.  But law can clearly play a role. More 
specifically, as summarized in Table 2, three sets of legal provisions can importantly 
affect the supply of nonprofit organizations: first, provisions establishing the general 
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posture of the legal system toward nonprofit organizations, including the kind of 
protection that is given to the right to associate; second, provisions governing the granting 
of legal personality status to nonprofit organizations; and third, provisions relating to the 
financing of these organizations.  Let us look at each of these in turn. 
 
 
Table 2: Supply-Side Indicators 
 
 
GENERAL LEGAL POSTURE 
 
• Right to associate 
• Allowable general purposes 




• Unincorporated organizations permissible? 
• Membership requirements? 
• Capital requirements? 
• Government involvement on boards? 
• Government discretion in granting legal status? 




• Broadness of organizational tax exemption 
• Income tax exemption 
• Real estate/property tax exemption 
• Stamp and other duties exemption  
• Indirect tax exemptions 
• Permissibility and tax treatment of unrelated business activities  
• Taxation of “unrelated” business income? 
• Organizational tax benefits for contributions 
• Tax benefits for individual donors 
• Tax benefits for corporate donors 
 
 
General Posture of the Law Toward Nonprofit Organizations.  At the most basic 
level, laws can shape the general climate for the formation of nonprofit organizations. At 
issue here is the question of whether there is a legally protected general “right” to 
establish such organizations, or whether their creation is considered to be merely a 
“privilege” that governmental authorities can bestow or take away.  The more clearly that 
prevailing laws, constitutional provisions, or legal norms establish a fundamental right to 
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form private organizations serving public purposes, the more likely it is that persons 
interested in promoting such purposes will take on the task of establishing them. By the 
same token, the more restrictive the range of purposes such organizations can serve, the 
less likely organizational entrepreneurs are to come forward to establish them and 
therefore the smaller the nonprofit sector we can expect.  Thus, for example, restrictions 
on the political or advocacy activities of nonprofit organizations can discourage some 
“political entrepreneurs” from the nonprofit field.  
 
Establishment. Legal provisions can also significantly affect the transaction costs 
involved in starting up a nonprofit organization. For one thing, laws can stipulate whether 
legal status is available to such organizations and, if so, under what circumstances. Such 
status can be important in protecting those involved with an organization from personal 
legal liability for the organization’s actions. Moreover, legal personality is often 
necessary to exercise essential property rights, such as the right to own real estate, to have 
a bank account, or to receive and manage bequests.  
 
However, formal incorporation, establishment or registration not only accord 
benefits, but also obligations, such as disclosure requirements. Occasionally, the 
information to be disclosed for formal legal recognition can be extensive. While in open 
and democratic countries this may serve to protect and foster trust in these organizations, 
as discussed above under demand-side features of the legal system, in more autocratic and 
restrictive regimes it may easily open avenues for close governmental supervision, 
control, and interference.  It is thus important that nonprofit organizations retain the 
option of remaining unincorporated and are not being forced to register in order not to 
become illegitimate. From this point of view, the most favorable framework permits 
nonprofit organizations to stay unincorporated or unregistered, but still grants a certain 
degree of legal protection to these organizations. 
 
To the degree that nonprofit organizations seek to obtain legal personality, the law 
may stipulate certain requirements, such as membership and capital requirements or 
special licenses, which may increase the barriers and costs to forming nonprofit 
organizations.  Clearly, the greater the number of members that must be identified and 
assembled (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1993, p.40) or the higher the amount of the 
required minimum capital that must be generated, the greater the concomitant costs for 
the nonprofit entrepreneur. 
 
Furthermore, the process of securing legal personality (by registration or 
incorporation) may also involve significant transaction costs.  Some countries require 
separate registration in each of a number of jurisdictions, for example, while others 
subject nonprofits to long delays in granting approval. Also important is the availability 
of appeals procedures so that arbitrary actions by administrative officials can be 
questioned by courts and challenged by applicants. 
 
Financing Provisions. Yet a third set of legal provisions can significantly affect 
the financial base of nonprofit organizations. Included here are tax exemptions for 
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organizations and preferential tax treatment for contributions to these organizations. Both 
of these accord financial advantages that offset, in whole or in part, the significant 
financial disadvantage nonprofits have in raising capital because of their inability to offer 
an equity stake in their operations to potential investors (Hansmann, 1987). The breadth 
or depth of these provisions can thus significantly affect the feasibility of funding such 
organizations, and thus their ability to prosper and survive. For example, organizations 
can be exempted from all taxes or just a selected range.  Similarly, different tax 
advantages can be afforded to different types of donors (individuals, foundations, 
corporations). In addition to these tax provisions, laws can influence the financing of 
nonprofit organizations more directly.  For example, certain types of revenue can be 




THE JOHNS HOPKINS NONPROFIT LAW INDEX 
 
In order to test this framework against the data from our comparative analysis of 
the scope of the nonprofit sector, it was first necessary to transform these concepts into 
operational terms.  For this purpose, we drew primarily on Salamon and Flaherty’s (1997) 
discussion of the ten most crucial issues in nonprofit law and assigned relevant legal 
issues discussed there to the demand- and supply-side features of our framework.  This 
resulted in an index with 24 items designed to capture the essence of the issues involved 
(see Appendix A). Armed with this index, we then reviewed the legal framework for 
nonprofit activity in our 22 countries as compiled by the team of legal experts we had 
assembled for this purpose and assigned values of 0, 1 or 2 to each country depending on 
the way its laws addressed the specified item.  We then summed the “scores” for each 
country to yield an aggregate score on both the demand and supply dimensions.  Since 
several of the legal dimensions involved more than a single provision of law, moreover, 
we compiled subtotals and averages for these to avoid biasing the overall results with 
these provisions and built these subtotal averages into our overall average.  
 
Given the complexity of legal provisions, this assignment of values to the 
different countries has taken an extraordinary amount of time.  In fact, it is still not 
complete, so that the results we can report here are still partial.  In fact, so far, we had 
complete legal information on all index items for only thirteen countries, and further 
follow-up on the remaining countries is necessary. While we aimed to design this process 
to be as objective as possible, moreover, there inevitably remains a certain degree of 
interpretation and discretion involved.  Finally, the use of a scoring system invariably 
blurs some of the finer distinctions of which the law is capable.  Our hope, however, is 
that even this preliminary review of the data we have gathered in the light of the 
framework we have created can shed useful light on how legal provisions can be 
analyzed.  
 
In what follows, therefore, we first review the range of variation our data reveal 
about the extent to which countries offer an enabling legal environment for nonprofit 
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action, as we have defined it; and then test the extent to which variations in the legal 
environment are associated in the predicted ways with variations in the strength of the 
nonprofit sector from country to country.  
 
 
TESTING FOR THE IMPACT OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
ON NONPROFIT DEVELOPMENT 
 
 With this operationalization of our basic framework, it was then possible to test 
the widespread hypothesis that legal environment affects the development of the 
nonprofit sector.  To carry out this test, we first computed the overall index scores for the 
13 countries where we had sufficient legal information. Out of a possible full composite 
average score of 8, these countries fell into a range from a score 6.67 (Israel) at the higher 
end to 4.17 (Japan) at the low. 
 
As indicated in Table 3, at the most enabling end of the spectrum in terms of this 
dimension of nonprofit law were Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States, with 
highly favorable legal regimes for nonprofit activity.  Mexican nonprofit law also ranked 
highly.  Australia and most European nations (except the Netherlands) occupied a middle 
place. Brazil and Japan were the two countries that ranked lowest. 
 
Table 3:  Country Scoring 
 
Index Score Country 
 
High  
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Further, we made use of the data generated by the Johns Hopkins Comparative 
Nonprofit Sector Project on the scale of nonprofit employment in different countries 
throughout the world (Salamon et. al., 1999). As shown in Figure 1, the size of the 
nonprofit sector varies greatly worldwide from 12.6% of total employment in the 
Netherlands to only 0.4% in Mexico. Employment was used as the dependent variable in 
this analysis because it is the most reliable measure of the scope of nonprofit action, but 
other measures will also be employed in subsequent tests. Both the legal scores and the 
nonprofit employment shares of total employment were then converted to z-scores, which 
measure the number of standard deviations that a country varies from the average of all 
countries on the given variable. 
Source: Salamon et al., 1999, p.14 
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Results 
Figure 2 below records the results of this analysis.  What it demonstrates is that 
the hypothesized relationship between the enabling quality of the legal environment for 
nonprofit action does seem to be related to the extent of development of the nonprofit 
sector.  Thus, most of the countries that scored the highest (Israel, the Netherlands, and 
the U.S.) also were among the countries with the relatively largest nonprofit sectors. The 
reverse seems true for Japan and Brazil. Most of the countries with medium score cluster 
in between.
Salamon and Toepler  The Influence of the Legal Environment on…the Nonprofit Sector 
 











-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2








































































Salamon and Toepler  The Influence of the Legal Environment 
 15 
While for most of the countries in the sample thus the relative favorability of the 
legal framework appears to relate to the size of the nonprofit sector, there are some 
important exceptions.  More specifically, Irish nonprofit law scored relatively poorly—
largely due to extremely limited tax incentives in this country, but the Irish nonprofit 
sector ranks nevertheless among the largest studied.  What this suggests is that limitations 
of the legal framework can be compensated, or even over-compensated, by other non-
legal institutional arrangements. In this country, nearly three-quarters of nonprofit 
revenues are derived from the public sector (Donoghue et al., 1999). The nonprofit sector 
development in Ireland has thus likely been driven more by public subsidy than by the 
degree of enablement (particularly fiscal enablement) of the legal framework.  A similar 
argument could be made for the U.K., where perhaps the prevalence of charitable and 
philanthropic traditions outweighs a somewhat lacking nonprofit legal system (especially 
in terms of tax provisions). 
 
Another significant outlier is Mexico, where an apparently quite favorable legal 
framework coincides with an extremely small nonprofit sector in terms of its economic 
size.  The reasons for this exception are not clear.  It could be an indication that favorable 
nonprofit laws  are a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for the economic 
development of the sector.  In other words, enabling laws are no guarantee for actual 
enablement.  However, as the Irish case has shown, an enabling fiscal framework does 
not even appear to be a necessary precondition. Whether it is only favorable tax laws that 
may not be truly necessary or whether this may also apply to other aspects of nonprofit 
law remains the subject of further analysis.  
 
An alternative explanation for the Mexican case could be that nonprofit law in this 
country was improved only fairly recently, and has thus not yet shown any effects. As 
Verduzco et al. (1999, pp.433-4) have noted, “the post-revolutionary state and the PRI 
[Party of the Institutionalized Revolution] discourages the formation of autonomous and 
voluntary associations … Since 1990, however, Mexico’s increasing democratic openness 
has been creating a new and favorable ground for the development of the nonprofit sector. 
Nonetheless, the effects of these recent changes will be seen only in years to come.”  
 
 This latter explanation might also be applicable to the Spanish case, where—to a 
lesser degree than in Mexico—the size of the sector is also smaller than the legal 
framework suggests. However, the Spanish legal provisions were adopted only relatively 
recently (in 1994) so that the size of the sector may really reflect earlier legal realities.  




 The data reported here thus do generally support the hypothesis that the more 
favorable the legal regime for nonprofit action, the more highly developed the nonprofit 
sector is.  At the same time, there are also important exceptions that make it clear that 
other factors are also at work.  
 
 Most importantly, however, while still in a preliminary stage, the analysis 
presented here may offer a useful framework for evaluating more systematically than has 
been possible heretofore the impact that nonprofit law actually has on nonprofit 
development. As such, it can hopefully move the discussion of the legal environment of 
the nonprofit sector beyond the realm of conjecture and at least a few steps closer to the 
realm of objective proof. 
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A. Demand-Side Indicators 
 
 




Legal Feature 0 1 2 
Nondistribution Constraint Constraint not embodied in law Provision embodied only in tax laws Provision embodied in general laws 
Personal Benefit 
Restrictions 
No restrictions for any kind of 
NPOs 
Restrictions for at least some types of 
NPOs or Limited general restrictions 
applicable to most NPOS 
Restrictions for all or most types of 
NPOs 
Reporting Requirements No requirements for any kind 
of NPOs 
Requirements for at least some types of 
NPOs or Limited general restrictions 
applicable to most NPOS 
Requirements for all or most types 
of NPOs 
Public Availability of 
Information 
None Limited public access for most NPOs or 
broad access for some types 
Broad public access to information 
on all or most NPOs 
Governance No requirements Specification of responsible organ only; 
or specification and decision rules for 
some types of NPOs 
Specification of responsible organ 
and decision-making rules for all or 
most NPOs 
Fundraising Regulation None, or few under narrow 
circumstances, or basic 
requirements for only some 
NPOS 
Basic registration or permit 
requirements for collections or 
fundraising campaigns for all or most 
types of NPOS or substantive 
restrictions of some types 
Substantive Restrictions (e.g. 
fundraising costs, types of activities 





B. Supply-Side Indicators 
 
Supply-side indicators measure legal features that might affect the willingness or ability 
of citizens to establish and operate nonprofit organizations. 
 
B.1. General Legal Posture 
 
Score  
Legal Feature 0 1 2 
Right of Association Not guaranteed Right granted through laws or legal 
tradition 
Guarantee embodied in 
Constitution  
Allowable Purposes Narrow, i.e. significant limita-
tions beyond general legality, 
morality or public order 
General prohibition of immoral 
purposes or activities against the public 
order 
Broad, i.e. no restrictions beyond 




Narrow, e.g. limitations on 
lobbying and advocacy 
Limitations on political campaigning Broad, i.e., no restrictions 
 










Unincorporated organizations lawful Some degree of legal protection for 
unincorporated organizations 
Membership Requirements Not clearly specified Clearly specified, but burdensome No Requirements or Clearly speci-
fied and not unduly burdensome 
Capital Requirements Not clearly specified or 
Specified and highly 
burdensome  
Clearly specified and moderately 
burdensome 
Clearly specified and not unduly 
burdensome 
Government right to 
appoint board members 
Authorities may appoint board 
members as a condition for 
granting legal status for all  or 
most types of NPOs 
Authorities may appoint board members 
as a condition for granting legal status 
for only some types of NPOs 
Authorities may not appoint board 
members for any type of NPO 
Government discretion in 
granting legal personality 
Discretion for all or most 
NPOs, even if minimum 
requirements are fulfilled. 
Discretion for certain types of NPOs, 
even if minimum requirements are 
fulfilled. 
If NPOs comply with legal 
minimum requirements, legal 
personality must be granted. 
Appeal Procedures Registration decisions cannot 
be appealed. 
Registration decisions can be appealed 
with registering authority 
Registration decisions can be ap-





Legal Feature 0 1 2 
Broadness of Organiza-
tional Tax Exemptions 
Specification of limited set of 
eligible organizations 
Relatively narrow definition of eligible 
purposes 
Relatively broad definition of 
eligible purposes 
Income Tax Exemptions No exemption from corporate 
income tax 
Partial Exemption in terms of coverage 
or tax rates 
Nearly or full exemption from 
corporate income tax 
Real Estate/Property Tax 
Exemption 
No exemption from real 
estate/property taxes 
Partial Exemption in terms of coverage 
or tax rates 
Nearly or full exemption from real 
estate/property taxes 
Stamp and Other Duties No Exemption from Duties Partial Exemption in terms of coverage 
or tax rates 
Nearly or full exemption from 
duties 
Indirect Tax Exemption 
(e.g. sales tax, VAT) 
No exemption from indirect 
taxes 
Partial Exemption in terms of coverage 
or tax rates 




Not permissible Permissible, but fully taxed Partially or fully exempt from tax 
or subject to reduced rates 
Organizational Tax 
Benefits for donations 
No benefits, such as gift or 
inheritance tax exemptions 
Partial Exemption in terms of coverage 
or tax rates 
Nearly or full Exemption from 
taxes on donations and bequests 
Tax Benefits for 
Individuals 
No or few tax deduction or 
credit 
Tax deduction or credit for limited set of 
purposes or types of organizations 
Tax deduction or credit for broad 
range of purposes 
Tax Benefits for 
Corporations 
No or few tax deduction or 
credit 
Tax deduction or credit for limited set of 
purposes or types of organizations 
Tax deduction or credit for broad 






Academy of Finland 
Aga Khan Foundation 
Arab Gulf Fund 
Arts and Humanities Council of Montgomery 
County/ Pew Charitable Trusts (U.S.) 
Aspen Institute Nonprofit Sector Research Fund 
(U.S.) 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Australian Research Council 
Austrian Science Foundation 
Canadian Fund (Slovakia) 
Catholic Relief Services 
Charities Aid Foundation 
Civil Society Development Foundation (Czech 
Republic) 
Civil Society Development Foundation 
(Romania) 
Civil Society Development Foundation 
(Slovakia) 
Colombian Center on Philanthropy 
Comission Communautaire Commune 
(Belgium) 
Confédération des entreprises non marchandes 
(Belgium) 
Department of Welfare (South Africa) 
Deutsche Bank Foundation (Germany) 
FIN (Netherlands) 
Fondation de France 
Ford Foundation 
Foundation for an Open Society (Hungary) 
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco (Colombia) 
Fundación Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (Spain) 
Fundación FES (Colombia) 
Morris Goldseker Foundation (U.S.) 
Humboldt Fd/Transcoop (Germany) 
Productivity Commission (Australia) 
Institute for Human Sciences (Austria) Inter-
American Development Bank 
Inter-American Foundation 
Juliana Welzijn Fonds (Netherlands) 
Kahanoff Foundation (Canada) 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation 
King Baudouin Foundation (Belgium) 
Körber Foundation (Germany) 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (U.S.) 
Ministère des affaires sociales (Belgium) 
Ministère de la Communauté flamande 
(Belgium) 
Ministère de la Communuaté française 
(Belgium) 
Ministère de l'emploi et de l'environnement 
(Belgium) 
Ministère de la Région Bruxelles-Capitale 
(Belgium) 
Ministère de la Région wallonne (Belgium) 
Ministry of Church & Education (Norway) 
Ministry of Culture & Sports (Norway) 
Ministry of Education, Culture, & Science 
(Netherlands) 
Ministry of Environment (Norway) 
Ministry of Family & Children (Norway) 
Ministry of Family/The World Bank 
(Venezuela) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway) 
Ministry of Health, Sports, & Welfare 
(Netherlands) 
Ministry of Social Affairs & Health (Finland) 
C.S. Mott Foundation 
National Department of Planning (Colombia) 
National Research Fund (Hungary) 
Norwegian Research Council 
OPEC 
Open Society Foundation (Slovakia) 
Open Society Institute/Budapest 
Open Society Institute/New York 
David and Lucile Packard Foundation (U.S.) 
Research Council of Norway 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (U.K.) 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Japan) 
Surdna Foundation (U.S.) 
U.S. Agency for International Development 
U.S. Information Service 
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